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Abstract—In the light of the ongoing electricity market 
integration in Europe, the debate has turned to a more regional 
approach of network access. Among other things, this leads to 
new questions with regard to the handling of congestion 
revenues. This paper explores the importance of a 
comprehensive view at the Congestion Revenue Cycle, 
consisting of the three stages revenue generation, revenue 
distribution and revenue usage. The relationship between 
available capacity and congestion revenue is examined and the 
effect of several revenue distribution keys is empirically 
investigated. The findings show that a revenue distribution must 
consider revenue generation and revenue usage to achieve 
sustainable results. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N recent years and based on the legal framework provided 
by EC regulation 1228/2003 and its guidelines, the concept 
of market-based access to cross-border transmission capacity 
in electricity networks has been established quite well 
throughout Europe. In the light of the ongoing electricity 
market integration, the debate has now turned to a more 
regional approach of network access. One of the concepts 
discussed e.g. in the Central Eastern and South Eastern 
regions of Europe foresees the introduction of so called 
flow-based capacity auctions with source-sink bidding. In 
this case, transmission capacity at several national borders of 
a region would be auctioned simultaneously in a coordinated 
fashion. Another attempt is to directly couple national 
electricity markets, as proposed for the Central Western 
region of Europe [1]-[3]. 
Among other things, both flow-based capacity auctions 
and market-coupling lead to new questions regarding the 
handling of congestion revenues. As there is no longer a 
bidding for individual borders, congestion revenue wouldn’t 
accrue directly to specific borders any more (as it is the case 
today), but would rather be collected by a regional fund. 
Clearly, how to re-distribute such a fund to participating 
countries and Transmission System Operators (TSOs) is a 
crucial issue which gained quite some attention recently [4], 
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[5]. Nonetheless, the actual “value-chain” of congestion 
revenue is often discussed by considering only some isolated 
steps of it, e.g. by focusing on revenue distribution keys while 
ignoring aspects linked to revenue generation or revenue 
usage. Such a partial view might however lead to inadequate 
conclusions and could eventually result in unintended 
incentives given to TSOs. 
This paper takes a different perspective and proposes an 
integrated view on the whole Congestion Revenue Cycle 
(CRC), consisting of the three parts revenue generation, 
revenue distribution, and revenue usage (Fig. 1). For each 
part of the cycle, the paper investigates some of the crucial 
aspects and questions, to be then able to bring these elements 
together and conclude on longer-term incentives and 
planning from a regulatory perspective.  
 
 
Fig. 1.  Congestion Revenue Cycle. 
II. CONGESTION REVENUE GENERATION  
A. Background and overview 
The first step of any Congestion Revenue Cycle (CRC) 
consists in actually generating the revenue by allocating 
scarce grid capacity to interested parties. As the transmission 
grid forms a natural monopoly, a possible approach to grant 
non-discriminatory access to it is to apply administrative 
procedures1 and regulated prices, which is however neither 
an efficient nor a market-based solution to this task [6]. 
Indeed, it wasn’t until the introduction of explicit auctions 
that a market-based solution for the allocation of transmission 
capacity became available. Auctions allow market 
participants to directly bid for and thus value (cross-border) 
transmission capacity. In this regard, the explicit auctions on 
the interconnectors between Germany and Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands as well as between France and 
Britain, all of them launched between 2000 and 2001, may be 
seen as a pioneering work [6], [7]. In the meantime, 
cross-border capacity auctions have been established on most 
frontiers throughout Europe [1].  
 
1  First-come first-served or pro-rata allocations are examples of 
administrative procedures. 
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From an institutional point of view, it’s important to realize 
that at the time market-based capacity allocations became 
necessary in Europe, liquid energy market platforms were not 
yet in place in most parts of the continent, and thus system 
operators took the responsibility for this task. Since then, 
capacity auctions have been complemented or replaced by a 
coupling of national energy markets in some regions, which 
will be discussed later on. 
In order to gain a general idea of the current cross-border 
congestion and capacity auction situation in Europe, Fig. 2 
provides an overview of the revenues collected by explicit 
capacity auctions in 2007, classified by border and direction. 
The chart is based on raw data of yearly, monthly and daily 
auction results collected by the authors for 23 borders.  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Capacity auction revenue by border and direction, 2007. Sources: 
ETSOVista, own analysis. 
 
Notes on Fig. 2:  
(1): In 2007, the Swiss-Italian border was only partly auctioned.  
 
(2): For the border directions of AT>IT and SK>HU, no information on daily 
auctions was available. Total auction revenue is thus likely to be higher. 
 
(3): For FR>BE and BE>NL, only yearly and monthly explicit auctions were 
considered, while congestion rent from day-ahead market-coupling is not 
included. 
 
(4): For all of these borders, the total revenue of daily auctions was 
extrapolated from a subset of days distributed throughout the year. This was 
due to limited batch access to data. 
 
Due to unavailability of data, the border between Spain and Portugal is not 
included in this survey. 
While the retrieval of such information on a large scale was 
almost impossible just a few years ago, the situation has 
improved significantly thanks to the arrival of ETSO’s 
transparency platform ETSOVista, which was launched in 
November 2006. The access to capacity and auction data, 
commercial schedules and physical flows is now open to the 
public and got a lot more comfortable for researchers, too2. 
As can be derived from Fig. 2, the total revenue of explicit 
capacity auctions collected in 2007 amounts to some 1400 
million Euros3. Compared to the average spot market value of 
electricity consumed in the UCTE region (some 115 billion 
Euro 4 ), cross-border capacity auction revenue currently 
represents roughly 1.5 % (excluding cost for redispatch 
measures). Based on the spot market value of UCTE 
cross-border exchanges (some 18 billion Euro 5 ), auction 
revenue accounts for approximately 8.5%. 
B. Theoretical relationship between congestion revenue, 
market prices and transfer capacities 
Regardless of whether two energy markets are coupled or 
merely linked by capacity auctions, the following two factors 
with an impact on congestion revenue6 can be identified:  
? National bid and offer curves: Every energy market 
possesses a characteristic demand and supply 
structure, which is primarily based on generation cost 
and consumption usages. Generation cost in turn may 
be driven by a combination of technological, natural 
and political factors. In the absence of market power, 
these costs are independent from the grid topology 
and any grid reinforcements. Demand and supply 
structure result in typical bid and offer curves, which 
eventually define an equilibrium market price. 
? Available transfer capacity: The available transfer 
capacity between two energy markets specifies the 
maximum energy exchange between these two 
markets. Remember that an export out of a market A 
leads to a higher market price in A, while an import 
into market B leads to a lower market price in B.  
To illustrate the relationship between these two variables, 
Fig. 3 shows supply and demand curves of two energy 
markets A (low price) and B (high price), which are 
connected by a transfer capacity of 1000 MW. Note that 
market A exports 1000 MW (demand curve shifts right, 
market price goes up), while market B imports 1000 MW 
(supply curve shifts right, market price goes down). Demand 
and supply shifts are indicated by arrows in Fig. 3. 
 
 
2 See www.etsovista.org 
3 Revenue from implicit auctions (i.e. market coupling) between France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands as well as between Spain and Portugal is not 
included and may add another 50 to 100 million Euros (own estimation based 
on market price differences and ATC values). 
4 2200 TWh * 50 EUR/MWh. UCTE consumption without countries BA, 
BG, CS, MK, RO, UA (as they are not included in the congestion revenue 
survey). 50 EUR/MWh is the average of 2007 averaged spot prices at EEX, 
Powernext and IPEX. Sources: UCTE and GME (Italian market operator). 
5 350 TWh * 50 Euro/MWh. Sources : UCTE and EEX, comments see 
footnote 4. 
6 In this paper, congestion revenue is defined as a general term for either 
congestion rent (in case of coupled markets) or auction revenue (in case of 
capacity auctions). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Supply and demand curves of two markets A and B. 
 
Next, Fig. 4 derives the congestion revenue graphically. 
Congestion revenue equals the remaining white surface after 
coloring demand and supply surpluses in markets A and B, 
i.e. 1000 MW times the market price difference7. In case of 
coupled markets, this revenue is collected as congestion rent 
by the market operator. In case of explicit capacity auctions, 
congestion revenue is split between the market operator on 
one hand, who receives the auction revenue, and traders on 
the other hand, who receive the delta between the actual 
market price difference and auction price as a margin. This 
margin also hedges risks resulting from inaccurate 
anticipation of future energy prices. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Congestion revenue derived from supply and demand surpluses. 
 
By looking at Fig. 3 and 4, it becomes clear that additional 
transfer capacity yields additional congestion revenue as long 
as market prices in A and B do not converge substantially. 
Such additional congestion revenue might be used to refund 
further transmission capacity expansion, for example. 
However, if the steep part of the demand curve in A is 
reached (higher demand elasticity, Fig. 3), market prices in A 
will start to rise significantly and converge towards the level 
of B, thereby diminishing congestion revenue. This time, 
there is no extra money available to refund a capacity 
expansion project. It may be collected from network tariffs, 
 
7 The sum of all the supply and demand surpluses, plus the congestion 
revenue, yields the total market value. 
or it may be taken from congestion revenue generated 
elsewhere in the region. We’ll come back to this point in the 
third and fourth section of this paper. 
C. Empirical evidence from explicit capacity auctions – 
the Laffer curves 
While the supply and demand curves of national electricity 
markets (i.e. their merit orders) aren’t directly visible for an 
external observer, what may be visible is the bidding behavior 
of market participants at explicit capacity auctions 8 . As 
illustrated in the previous section, this bidding behavior 
anticipates future market price differences, which in turn rely 
on supply and demand curves of national energy markets and 
available transfer capacity. 
The relationship between auction revenue and available 
transmission capacity is an aspect of particular relevance with 
regard to the Congestion Revenue Cycle and TSO incentives. 
This is because a sound regulatory policy must prevent TSO’s 
from “creating” congestion as a potential source of income, as 
this would clearly impede an efficient cross-border energy 
market. For instance, congestion could be created artificially 
by announcing capacity values lower than required by 
security standards 9 , or by avoiding necessary grid 
expansions. Indeed, such concerns have been expressed by 
market actors and regulators as well [8], [9]. Based on these 
considerations, the current section is going to provide some 
insights into how exactly available transfer capacity (ATC) 
influences auction revenues at European borders.  
 
For this purpose, let’s recall that a typical capacity auction 
applies a principle known as uniform or marginal bid pricing, 
i.e. the last accepted bid sets the clearing price for all accepted 
bids10. The auction revenue is thus given by the product of 
available transfer capacity times the marginal bid price (also 
called the clearing price, CP), see formula 1:  
Auction revenue = ATC * CP (1) 
The so called bid curve displays bid prices and bid volumes 
as submitted by auction participants. By multiplying the 
corresponding bid prices and volumes, an auction revenue 
curve as illustrated in Fig. 5 is obtained. This curve features 
two main parts: First, there is an upward slope, which means 
that auction revenue is rising along with increasing demand. 
At some point, the curve reaches its maximum, which 
corresponds to the static maximum auction revenue (see 
below). In the second part of the curve, there is a downward 
slope, which means that the additional demand can no longer 
compensate the falling marginal bid price, and the auction 
revenue begins to decrease until it’s zero. 
Such a relationship is well known in tax theory as the 
“Laffer Curve”, which states that a government’s tax income 
 
8 Public access to bid curves (e.g. on TSO websites) depends however on 
local Auction Rules, which differ from border to border. 
9 E.g. by considering unrealistic worst-case scenarios, or by applying 
unfounded security margins. 
10 For a discussion of uniform vs. pay-as-bid auction, see e.g. [26] 
 
 
 
increases up to a certain tax rate, before it starts falling as 
taxable substrate becomes less, e.g. because taxable entities 
relocate to other regions or stop working. For both of the two 
extremes (i.e. 0% or 100% tax rate), the tax income will be 
zero. 
For our purpose, the interesting question is whether ATC 
values on European borders lie on the upward or on the 
downward slope of the auction revenue curve. An ATC on the 
upward slope implies rising auction revenue by additional 
capacity, whereas an ATC on the downward slope signifies 
less revenue with every additional MW and may indeed 
incentivize a revenue seeking TSO to reduce announced 
capacity. In analogy to the taxation Laffer curve, auction 
revenue will be zero if there’s no capacity available to be 
auctioned or if capacity is abundant and there is no congestion 
(Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Theoretical Auction Revenue Curve (“Laffer Curve”). 
 
As a matter of fact, the analysis of an auction revenue curve 
is of static nature. Underlying bid curves depend crucially on 
the available capacity. This is because it influences expected 
market price differences (Fig. 3), which in turn determine the 
bidding behavior. A substantial change in ATC (e.g. by 
building a new line) thus implies a redrawn revenue curve. 
For smaller, e.g. calculatory ATC changes11, however, the 
revenue curve is assumed to be static and can be linearized 
around the current ATC level. 
 
To explore the relationship between ATCs and auction 
revenues empirically, the authors examined ATC values and 
bid curves (where accessible) of several European borders. 
As an example, Fig. 6 displays the revenue curve of the 
monthly auction between France and Germany from August 
2008. As can be seen, the ATC value lies far below the 
maximum revenue level on the upward slope of the revenue 
curve. In this case, for smaller, e.g. calculatory capacity 
changes, more capacity would lead to more auction revenue. 
12  For larger capacity changes, e.g. by infrastructure 
 
11 In contrast to an infrastructure related change in ATC, a calculatory 
change may consist of different assumptions regarding load flow patterns, for 
example.  
12 This is true regardless of whether an annual or a monthly auction is 
observed. For daily auctions, the creation of Laffer curves is usually not 
possible. This is because every hour of the following day is auctioned 
expansions, auction revenue would increase with capacity as 
long as the impact on market price convergence is relatively 
low. When market prices start converging due to additional 
cross-border capacity, auction revenue is likely to fall. In 
general, this situation was observed for several of the 
commercially significant European borders, i.e. those linking 
large markets with a substantial price spread (Fig. 2 and 9). 
These findings are consistent with theoretical foundations 
provided in the former section.  
 
 
Fig. 6.  Auction revenue curve from France to Germany, August 2008. Data 
Source: RTE. 
 
The most recent example of how congestion revenue can 
finance new interconnections is provided by the NorNed 
cable between the Netherlands and Norway, which became 
operational in May 2008. With a capacity of 700 MW and 
total project cost of 600 million Euros, NorNed auction 
revenues amounted to approx. 50 million Euros within the 
first two months of operation, i.e. 8% of the total investment 
cost. This implies a full cost recovery within a time span of 
only 2 years13. 
D. Remarks on TSOs and financial incentives 
It may be argued that TSOs are in fact revenue-neutral 
entities, for example because they are obliged to transfer 
congestion revenue directly to customers by lowering their 
network tariffs, or increase those tariffs to fund grid 
investments. In this case, though, the spotlight shifts from 
TSOs to regulators, as they usually determine or approve 
network tariffs and thus may have an interest in a continuous 
flow of congestion revenue as a means to subsidize these 
tariffs. We’ll take a closer look at revenue usage later on in 
this paper, but sure enough, the observed details of revenue 
generation will play their role in the upcoming 
considerations. 
At any rate, the analysis so far suggests that financial 
incentives might not be a suitable means to guide the behavior 
of TSOs, e.g. with respect to maximizing transfer capacities. 
As suggested by our empirical findings, TSOs indeed would 
already have such an incentive at several commercially 
significant borders in Europe, at least for smaller (e.g. 
                                                                                                  
individually and there often aren’t enough bids per hour to review the 
relationship empirically. 
13 Numbers provided by the Dutch TSO TenneT (www.tennet.org) and the 
NorNed auction website (www.norned-auction.org). 
 
 
 
calculatory) capacity augmentations. The fact that they don’t 
do so hints at the relevance of more profound aspects related 
to grid security, which TSOs must primarily take into 
account. Having in mind the costs of a serious grid security 
failure, i.e. a black-out14, there is no room left to maximize 
commercial capacity beyond security limits. 
III. CONGESTION REVENUE DISTRIBUTION 
A. Introducing congestion revenue distribution keys 
After the congestion revenue has been generated, the next 
step of the Congestion Revenue Cycle is about distributing 
the money. Traditional explicit auctions have been defined in 
a bilateral way between adjacent countries15. Following this 
logic, auction revenue accrues to the border where it was 
generated and it is usually distributed in equal parts to the 
TSOs of the adjacent countries, which in turn are usually the 
direct or indirect owners of the cross-border interconnectors. 
In contrast, if the congestion revenue stems from 
flow-based capacity auctions with source-sink bidding, or 
from a multilateral market coupling scheme, then the revenue 
is collected centrally for all participating countries (as there is 
no longer a “bidding” for individual borders). The question of 
how to re-distribute the region-wide congestion revenue now 
becomes one of utmost importance to participating TSOs and 
regulators. 
That said, it’s worth recalling that the congestion revenue 
belonging to a specific interconnector (or country border) is 
by definition given as the price difference over that 
interconnector (or border) times the flow through it (or a 
normative ATC value, for that matter). This definition 
remains unchanged even if coordinated flow-based capacity 
auctions or a market coupling scheme is introduced. It can be 
considered as a “natural revenue distribution”, while any 
other distribution would imply a reallocation of congestion 
revenues, which needs some sort of justification [10]. 
South-East Europe (SEE) was one of the first continental 
European regions to tackle the question of auction revenue 
distribution in the wake of their “Dry-run for coordinated, 
flow-based explicit auctions” launched in 2003. During their 
pioneering work, the involved parties came up with a variety 
of conceivable distribution-keys and discussed their pros and 
cons in detail [11], [12]. 
Based on this discussion, the authors conducted an 
empirical survey of European borders to study the 
prospective impact of these distribution keys (if applied in 
Central Europe). The goal was not to simulate specific 
auction results as snapshots, but to gain a high-level 
 
14 For example, the Italy blackout of 28 September 2003 cost approx. 1 bn 
EUR, the US North-East blackout of 14 August 2003 cost approx. 4.8 bn 
USD, and the costs of a potential black-out on the Austrian extra high-voltage 
grid are estimated to 40 mn EUR per hour. Source: Austrian Verbund. 
15 Even if capacity calculations or auction operation are performed in a 
coordinated, multilateral fashion.  See e.g. the existing coordinated auction 
office for Central Eastern Europe (based in Prague) or the coordinated 
capacity assessment at the Italian Northern borders. 
understanding of the different impacts on revenue 
distribution. The following section provides a very short 
description of several distribution keys and presents the 
findings of the empirical investigation. For a more detailed 
discussion of the distribution keys, please refer to the sources 
mentioned above. 
TABLE I 
AUCTION REVENUE DISTRIBUTION KEYS 
Category Key 
A. Grid-usage a. Absolute grid-usage 
 
 b. Relative grid-usage 
 
B. Economic signals 
 
a. Difference in market clearing prices 
 
 b. Shadow prices 
 
C. Asset-based 
 
a. Asset base or investment plan 
A.a Absolute grid-usage: Congestion revenue is 
distributed according to the physical usage of the grid, i.e. 
load flows. The idea is to encourage maximization of transfer 
capacities. However, the key honors capacity investments 
regardless of their overall efficiency. Also, it would channel 
money to borders where no congestion exists (and no 
investment is needed). Last but not least, it should be noted 
that in Europe, third-party “grid-usage” ought to be covered 
by the ITC mechanism. 
Fig. 7 shows the 2007 distribution of load flows within 
UCTE16.  
A.b relative grid-usage: Congestion revenue is 
distributed according to the relative usage of transfer 
capacities. The idea is to channel money to borders which are 
intensively used and may need expansion. However, the key 
sets an incentive to artificially create congestion by lowering 
ATCs or by not investing. Also, money would accrue to 
borders with no congestion. Finally, ATC values are 
commercial values and are not a well defined reference for 
such purposes. Fig. 8 underlines this conclusion, showing that 
flows may reach far above commercial transfer capacities17. 
 
Fig. 7.  Top 15 of cross-border load flows in 2007. Source: UCTE. 
 
16 Please note that load flows include unscheduled “loop-flows” as well as 
natural flows, which take place without any exchange. 
17 This is mainly due to unscheduled load flows, i.e. loop-flows. 
 
 
 
B.a Difference in market clearing prices: Congestion 
revenue is distributed according to the difference in market 
clearing prices between two adjacent countries. The idea is to 
allocate money to borders where adjacent market prices have 
not yet converged. However, the key sets incentives to keep 
up congestion. Fig. 9 displays averaged yearly and monthly 
bilateral auction clearing prices as a reference for market 
price spreads. 
B.b Shadow prices: Congestion revenue is distributed 
according to shadow prices. The shadow price of a border 
equals the additional, regional congestion revenue collected 
by increasing the capacity of that border marginally (e.g. by 1 
kW). The idea is to channel money to borders where a 
capacity increase is of highest economic value. However, 
shadow prices are a very volatile figure and can’t provide any 
longer-term incentives. Also, such a distribution would 
discourage capacity investments, as a border loaded with 99% 
of its capacity has a shadow price of zero and wouldn’t 
receive any congestion revenue. As shadow prices are actual 
snapshots of a specific auction result, no high-level overview 
is provided. To a certain extent, shadow prices are however 
linked to market price spreads (Fig. 9) 
 
Fig. 8:. Top 15 of physical usage of cross-border capacity, defined as the ratio 
of load flow to averaged NTC value, 2007 data. Sources: UCTE, ETSO. 
 
Fig. 9.  Top 15 of clearing prices of yearly and monthly auctions 2007 
(averaged values). Source: ETSOVista and TSO websites. 
 
C Asset base or investment plans: Congestion revenue is 
distributed according to either existing asset values (of 
cross-border interconnectors) or according to future 
investment projects. The idea is to refund existing 
infrastructure or future investments by channeling congestion 
revenue accordingly. However, relevant asset values are 
hardly transparent and comparable so far. Also, the key may 
lead to inefficient investment projects. As data on assets or 
investment plans isn’t publicly available, no empirical 
comparison was conducted. 
 
B. Distribution keys: A sustainable approach? 
Our empirical analysis of the distribution keys suggests 
that different keys result in substantially different revenue 
distribution patterns. Furthermore, incentives given to TSOs 
depend to a large extent on the choice of the distribution key 
and may diverge remarkably. The preliminary conclusion of 
SEE working groups, i.e. that there is no single best 
distribution key, was confirmed. As a possible solution to this 
dilemma, SEE proposed to combine several keys into a 
hybrid-key, which could balance the pros and cons of 
individual keys according to regulatory intentions.  
Our paper adds a different perspective: If revenue 
distribution is considered as a central part of the CRC, then it 
becomes obvious that in fact all of the distribution keys 
implicitly assume two things: (1) That capacity expansions 
can’t be financed by additional congestion revenue generated 
through the expansion itself, and (2) that re-distributed 
revenue could indeed be invested in feasible projects at the 
selected borders. However, the first assumption is likely to be 
unjustified at least for some of the commercially important 
European borders (see Section II), whereas the second 
assumption remains critical in practice, as will be shown in 
the next section. 
Therefore, a sustainable congestion revenue distribution 
scheme must consider revenue generation and realistic 
revenue usage. It could be based on the natural distribution 
key, i.e. price spread times load flow or ATC value, which 
would also be in accordance with EC rules for merchant 
transmission lines (i.e. same distribution, but different usage 
of congestion revenue). 
IV. CONGESTION REVENUE USAGE 
A. From EC regulation 1228/2003 to the 3rd package 
As mentioned in the introduction, EC regulation 
1228/2003 is the valid legal framework for the topic of 
cross-border electricity exchanges and capacity allocation. 
Article 6.6 of the regulation specifies that congestion revenue 
must be used for any of the following three purposes: (a) 
Guaranteeing actual availability of allocated capacity (i.e. 
redispatching), (b) maintaining or increasing capacities by 
investment, or (c) Reducing network tariffs. In its 2007 report 
on the experiences gained from the application of regulation 
1228/2003, the European Commission regretted that 
congestion revenue had been used primarily for lowering 
network tariffs, while only few network investments had been 
realized [13]. According to the EC sector inquiry, between 
 
 
 
2001 and 2005 no more than 16.8% to 33.3%18 of congestion 
revenues had been reinvested in infrastructure [14]. 
Still in 2007, the EC published its proposal for a third 
energy package, revising Directive 2003/54 and Regulation 
1228/2003. Concerning congestion revenues, the EC 
proposed to restrict their usage to (a) guaranteeing the actual 
availability of allocated capacity and (b) maintaining or 
increasing capacities by investment. Lowering network tariffs 
would no longer be allowed. In case congestion revenue can’t 
be spent immediately by investment, the money would be 
placed on a special account, until such investment projects 
become available. 
It looks like the EC proposal was inspired by the current 
congestion revenue framework of Nordel, the body for 
co-operation between the TSOs in Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden19. Nordel foresees the use of 
congestion rents, which reached approx. 100 million Euro in 
2005, for the exclusive purpose of covering redispatch cost or 
expanding capacity between Nordic states or between the 
Nordic region and adjacent regions20. In this regard, Nordel 
has identified several priority projects [15].  
On one hand, this approach is convincing thanks to its 
progressive aim at regional grid planning and market 
integration. On the other hand, real-world experience seems 
to indicate that such an “investment-only” approach faces 
hurdles in its practical implementation. First of all, it appears 
difficult enough to find an agreement among stakeholders on 
priority projects at a regional scope. And even if an 
agreement is eventually found, such projects all too often 
can’t be accomplished due to local resistance from the 
political-environmental side. Previously collected congestion 
revenues may thus get blocked for years and don’t flow back 
to loads who had to pay it initially, which  may bring TSOs 
under suspicion of withholding congestion revenues [16], 
[17]. Also, the pressure to re-invest congestion revenues (no 
matter how) could lead to inefficient investment decisions. 
While Nordic TSOs don’t reallocate congestion revenues 
directly to suppliers of load as a hedge against their 
congestion cost 21 , this is exactly what the so called 
Congestion Revenue Rights (CRR) model does, which is 
applied in many of the restructured US electricity markets. In 
general, the relationship between loads bearing investment 
costs and loads bearing congestion cost should be explored in 
more detail. In Europe, these two load groups are 
overlapping, but they are not equal and usually belong to 
different countries. 
 
18  The numbers apply to vertically integrated TSOs and 
ownership-unbundled TSOs, respectively 
19 In the EC commentary on the 3rd package proposal, the Nordel is 
indeed mentioned as an exemplary model. 
20 Statnett’s financing of the NorNed cable between Norway and the 
Netherlands is such an example. 
21  Instead, Nordpool introduced so called Contracts for Differences 
(CFDs) in 2000, which have no connection to the TSO or to the congestion 
revenue, but are concluded among market participants to swap their 
locational risk-profiles [24]. 
B. Congestion revenues: Sufficient to finance the grid? 
To what extent could congestion revenue possibly 
contribute to grid expansion projects in Europe? 
Pérez-Arriaga et al. showed that for a theoretical, optimally 
expanded electricity grid 22 , the congestion revenue from 
short-term locational marginal pricing of electricity is exactly 
equal to the total network cost23  and thus sufficient to recover 
investments for any time interval. In practice however, 
congestion rents of actual power systems “grossly fail” to 
recover total network cost. According to Pérez-Arriaga, this 
is due reasons such as sub-optimal network planning, the 
strongly discrete nature of grid investments, economies of 
scale or reliability constraints, all of which lead to 
over-investment and under-recovery of network cost. 
Pérez-Arriaga cites field-studies from Latin American 
countries, Spain, New Zealand and South Africa  confirming 
that congestion revenues generally recover no more than 30% 
of actual network cost, and sometimes as little as 4%. 
Therefore, a two-part tariff scheme, which imposes a fixed 
transmission tariff in addition to revenues from locational 
pricing, is essential to fully finance an actual grid [18]-[22]. 
In central Europe, congestion revenue is collected only on 
borders between countries, as there is no locational pricing 
within countries24. As derived in Section II, cross-border 
congestion revenue amounts to approx. 1.5 billion Euros per 
year. By 2006, the UCTE extra high voltage electricity 
network consisted of approx.  220’000 km of overhead lines 
(220 to 400 kV). Its net book value is estimated to about 40 
billion Euros25, and an additional 10 to 20 billion Euros is 
expected to be invested by TSOs till 2015, i.e. 1 to 2 billion 
Euros per year [23]. Compared to these numbers, it appears 
that congestion revenue could indeed cover a non-negligible 
part of new cross-border investment projects, but it’s 
definitely not sufficient to finance total grid costs. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. Preliminary remark on flow-based capacity auctions 
with source-sink bidding 
As was shown in a previous paper, the zonal flow-based 
model relies on assumptions that are not fulfilled in the UCTE 
grid [25]. Additionally, flow-based capacity auctions with 
source-sink bidding may actually impede planning certainty 
for market participants. This is because they introduce new 
interdependencies between individual borders, which can’t 
be controlled or foreseen by any market participant, without 
providing a direct access to foreign energy markets. Initially 
 
22 Grid expansion is optimal if a system operator invests to the point when 
incremental investment cost equal incremental incurred savings in total 
operation cost. 
23  Total network cost consists of investment cost and operation cost 
including transmission losses. 
24  Without locational pricing, congestion revenue transforms into to 
producer and consumer surplus.  
25 The estimated net book value is cited as a comparison value only. It is 
not the relevant number with regard to future investments. 
 
 
 
designed as a political compromise and a “first step”, it 
remains to be seen if it’s a step forward or backward with 
regard to electricity market integration and grid security. 
B. Conclusions on the Congestion Revenue Cycle 
The findings of this paper point at the importance of a 
comprehensive view of the Congestion Revenue Cycle. 
Above all, revenue distribution should clearly consider both 
where (and how) the revenue was initially generated and how 
it is to be used. Congestion revenue accrues naturally to a 
transmission line according to the price spread over it times 
the flow through it (or times a commercial ATC value). When 
setting up a re-distribution of congestion revenue, it should be 
taken into account that grid expansions at commercially 
significant European borders may indeed be financed by 
additional congestion revenue generated by the expansion 
itself. Also, an investment-only revenue usage policy (as 
proposed by the third Energy Package of the EU) is likely to 
face hurdles in its practical implementation due to local 
resistance and political-environmental concerns, and could 
produce inefficient investments. Finally, the relationship 
between loads bearing investment costs and loads bearing 
congestion costs should be further explored for the European 
case. 
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